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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(a) (2007). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's imposition of an 
injunction against Appellants' interference with the maintenance of Wendy V drive-through 
facilities. 
The Court of Appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness, focusing on whether that 
court correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review. 
In the context of a summary judgment motion, which presents a question of law, the Court 
employs a correctness standard and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 
414 12, 164 P-3d 366 (citing Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50,1 7, 94 P.3d 915). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises, LC and White Investment Co., 
Inc. (collectively, "Appellants") own the Canyon Rim Shopping Center (the "Shopping 
Center") located at approximately 3300 East 3300 South in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Defendant/Appellant Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York, Inc. ("Wendy's") 
owns and operates a restaurant on a parcel within the Shopping Center (the "Wendy's 
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Property"). This case concerns the location of a drive-through lane and related facilities (the 
"Drive-Through Facilities") constructed in 1982 and associated with the Wendy's Property. 
Course of Proceedings 
This action was originally filed by Metropolitan Square Associates ("Metropolitan 
Square") on July 30, 2004. [R. at 1.] Metropolitan Square's Complaint alleged that the 
Drive-Through Facilities constituted a trespass with respect to the Shopping Center and a 
breach of contract with respect to the Declaration of Restrictions and Grant of Easements (the 
"Declaration") governing the Shopping Center. [R. at 2-4.] Metropolitan Square sought an 
injunction requiring Wendy's to remove the Drive-Through Facilities and unspecified 
monetary damages. [R. at 4.] In its Answer, Wendy's denied Metropolitan Square's 
allegations. Wendy's also and asserted counterclaims for: (1) a declaratory judgment to the 
effect that Wendy's is entitled to maintain the Drive-Through Facilities in their present 
location; (2) recognition of a prescriptive easement in Wendy's favor pursuant to which 
Wendy's is entitled to maintain and use the Drive-Through Facilities in theirpresent location; 
and (3) an injunction barring Metropolitan Square from interfering with Wendy's' right to 
use and maintain the Drive-Through Facilities. [R. at 15-60.] 
Following some discovery, Metropolitan Square filed an Amended Complaint, which 
substituted Appellants as plaintiffs and added allegations to the effect that Wendy's' menu-
board signs (the "Menu-Board Signs") also constitute a breach of the Declaration. [R. at 78-
87, 102-03.] 
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Wendy's filed a motion for summary judgment on September 30, 2005. [R. at 114-
16.] After full briefing and oral argument, the trial court entered a Minute Entry on 
December 12,2005 granting Wendy's' motion. [R. at 307-10.] The trial court subsequently 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Final Judgment dismissing all claims 
asserted in Appellant's Amended Complaint. [R. at 375-83; 384-87.] The trial court's Final 
Judgment stated that the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs are permitted by 
the Declaration and may remain in place, enjoined Appellants from interfering with Wendy's 
use and maintenance of the Drive-Through Facilities and Menu-Board Signs, and awarded 
Wendy's its costs and attorneys' fees in the amount of $19,516.50. [R. at 384-87.] 
Appellants appealed the trial court's Final Judgment. [R. at 397-99.] The Utah Court 
of Appeals issued an opinion following full briefing and oral argument. [2007 UT App 211.] 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Final Judgment in part and reversed and 
remanded in part. Specifically, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's determination 
that Appellants' trespass claim was time barred, and affirmed the trial court's decision to 
enjoin Appellants from interfering with the Drive-Through Facilities. [Id., at ]flf 27-30.] In 
addition, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
Wendy's' favor on Appellants' breach of contract claim with respect to the Menu-Board 
Signs. [Id., at 118.] The Court of Appeals also vacated the trial court's award of attorneys 
fees and costs and remanded the issue to the trial court. [Id., at | 33.] 
Appellants filed their petition for a Writ of Certiorari on July 23, 2007. The Court 
granted the writ on October 23, 2007 as to the issue set forth above. 
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Statement of Facts 
The Wendy's Property is located within the Shopping Center owned by Appellants. 
[R. at 376.] Both the Wendy's Property and the Shopping Center are included in the property 
described in the Declaration, recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office on 
September 24, 1982 as entry No. 3714292, in Book 5410, at Page 823. [R. at 376.] The 
Declaration identifies three distinct parcels of property within the property described therein. 
[R. at 376.] The Wendy's Property is located within what the Declaration refers to as "Parcel 
Three." [R. at 376.] Plaintiff/Appellant White Investment, Inc. owns parcels one and two, 
and American Stores Properties, Inc. ("ASPI") leases Parcel One from White Investment, 
Inc. [R. at 30-32.] 
The Wendy's property was developed as a Burger King restaurant by The Boyer 
Company in or about 1982. [R. at 376.] At that time, a drive-through lane was constructed 
on the north side of the Wendy's Property. [R. at 377.] The drive-through lane is bounded 
on the north by a narrow, landscaped island edged with concrete curbing, and on the south 
by the restaurant (the drive-through lane and related island are referred to herein as the 
"Drive-Through Facilities"). [R. at 377.] The Drive-Through Facilities extend from the 
northwest corner of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast onto 
what is defined by the Declaration as the "Common Area." [R. at 377.] Exhibit "A" to the 
Declaration is a sketch of the Shopping Center labeled "Proposed Site Plan" (the "Plot 
Plan"). [R. at 52.] The Plot Plan shows the Drive-Through Facilities as two curved lines 
running from the northwest corner of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the 
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northeast. [R. at 377.] Although the Plot Plan does not purport to be a survey, the physical 
relationship between the restaurant building and drive-through lane as shown on the Plot Plan 
is generally consistent in scale with the actual location of the restaurant located on the 
Wendy's Property and the Drive-Through Facilities. [R. at 120.] From the time they were 
constructed in or about 1982 through the present, the Drive-Through Facilities have remained 
in continuous use in the same location and configuration. [R. at 378.] 
With respect to Parcel Three, the Declaration provides that 
No building featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through traffic shall be 
located on Parcel Three, except as shown on the Plot Plan, without the prior 
written consent of the Owner of Parcel Two and ASPI, including consent to 
the location of the drive-in, drive-up or drive-through lanes of such facility. 
Such consent will not be unreasonably withheld provided that the location of 
such lanes and the use thereof do not impede or inhibit access to and from the 
conduct of business from the buildings in the Shopping Center or access to and 
from the adjacent streets. 
[R. at 38.] With respect to "Common Area," the Declaration provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
Common Area shall be used only for vehicular access, circulation and parking, 
pedestrian traffic and the comfort and convenience of the Owners (i.e., the 
owners of the property to which the Declaration pertains), tenants, customers, 
invitees, licensees, agents and employees of the Owners and business 
occupants of the buildings constructed in the Shopping Center (i.e., the owners 
of the property to which the Declaration pertains), and for the servicing and 
supplying of such businesses, except as otherwise provided herein . . . . No 
building, barricade or structure may be placed, erected or constructed within 
the Common Area on any parcel except loading and delivery docks and 
covered areas attached to such docks, trash enclosures, outside storage areas 
. . . pylon (to the extent not herein prohibited) and directional signs, bumper 
guards or curbs, paving, landscaping and landscape planters, lighting 
standards, driveways, sidewalks, walkways, parking stalls, columns or pillars 
supporting roof overhangs, and any other improvements as may be required 
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under applicable laws, rules, ordinances and regulations of any governmental 
body having jurisdiction over the Shopping Center . . . . The parking and 
vehicular traffic patterns for the areas of the Shopping Center which are 
designated "Common Area Only" on the Plot Plan [attached to the Declaration 
as Exhibit "A"] shall be designed, installed and maintained as shown on the 
Plot Plan. 
[R. at 32-33; 377-78.] Relatedly, with respect to passage over the Common Area, the 
Declaration states that 
Each Owner, as grantor with respect to each parcel owned by such Owner, 
hereby grants to each of the other Owners, as grantees, for the benefit of each 
of such other Owners and their respective tenants, employees, agents, 
customers and invitees of such tenants, and for the benefit of each parcel 
owned by such grantee, a non-exclusive easement appurtenant to each parcel 
owned by each grantee for ingress and egress by vehicular and pedestrian 
traffic and for vehicular parking upon, over and across the Common Area 
within each parcel or parcels owned by the grantor. 
[R. at 34-35.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellants contend first that the Court of Appeals' decision should be reversed 
because it conflicts with this Court's decision in Nyman v. Anchor Development, L.L.C., 
2003 UT 27, 73 P.3d 357. There is no conflict because this case is factually different from 
Nyman in two important respects. First, unlike the garage at issue in Nyman, the Drive-
Through Facilities are expressly permitted by the Declaration. Wendy's has a contractual 
right to maintain the Drive-Through Facilities. Second, while the garage at issue mNyman 
permanently occupied the defendant's property and could only be used by the plaintiff, the 
Drive-Through Facilities are open to all patrons of the Shopping Center and serve to separate 
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travel and parking areas as provided by the Declaration. These facts demonstrate that Nyman 
is inapplicable to this case. 
Appellants also argue that the trial court could not enjoin their removal of the Drive-
Through Facilities without first passing on the merits of Wendy's' claim that the Drive-
Through Facilities are expressly authorized by the Declaration. The trial court's injunction 
was proper because the Drive-Through Facilities are located in accordance with the 
Declaration and Appellants failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material 
fact on this point. Further, contrary to Appellants' assertion, the trial court did consider the 
merits of Wendy's' claim that the Drive-Through Facilities are expressly authorized by the 
Declaration. Finally, all claims asserted in this case were before the trial court on Wendy's' 
motion for summary judgment and it made no difference whether the trial court granted 
Wendy's' request for an injunction or denied Appellants' request for an injunction. This 
Court should, therefore, affirm the Court of Appeals' decision. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's determination that Appellants' trespass 
and breach of contract claims are time-barred. That ruling is not at issue in this appeal. 
Based on its determination that the relevant statutes of limitation had run on Appellants' 
claims, the Court of Appeals also correctly held that Appellants' demand for an injunction 
requiring the removal of the Drive-Through Facilities was untimely. Only this decision is 
before the Court. See Order (granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari), dated October 23, 
2007. 
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Appellants raise two arguments in support of their contention that the Court of 
Appeals improperly affirmed the trial court's issuance of an injunction. First, Appellants 
contend that the Court of Appeals' decision should be reversed because it conflicts with this 
Court's decision in Nyman v. Anchor Development, L.L.C., 2003 UT 27, 73 P.3d 357. 
Second, Appellants argue that the trial court and the Court of Appeals improperly granted 
Wendy's' request for injunctive relief before making "any determination on the merits that 
would support the injunction." See Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellants, at p. 8. Neither of 
Appellants' arguments withstands scrutiny. This Court should, therefore, affirm the Court 
of Appeals' decision with respect to the injunctive relief granted by the trial court. 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH 
NYMAN 
In Nyman v. Anchor Development, L.L.C., this Court held that a prescriptive right to 
use real property cannot arise out of the maintenance of permanent improvements on land 
owned by another. See id., at Tflf 17-18. Appellants interpret Nyman far too broadly to mean 
that a person can never exclusively possess real property they do not own. See Brief of 
Plaintiffs/Appellants at pp. 11-12 ("[A]s a result of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
[Appellants] are the owners of property from which they are completely excluded, and 
Wendy's is in exclusive possession of property it does not own. This result is in direct 
conflict with the decision of this Court in Nyman"). As a result of their over-expansive 
interpretation, Appellants contend that the Court of Appeals erred by forbidding them to 
remove the Drive-Through Facilities. The facts and legal issues in the instant case, however, 
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are entirely different from those in Nyman in that Wendy's has an express easement to 
maintain the Drive-Through Facilities, and the Drive-Through Facilities do not result in 
exclusive possession. Consequently, Nyman is inapposite. 
A. Wendy's Has the Right to Maintain the Drive-Through Facilities 
under the Shopping Center Declaration 
The most glaring flaw in Appellants' argument is its failure to account for Wendy's' 
contractual right and express easement to maintain the Drive-Through Facilities. Those 
rights arise out of the Declaration, which contains covenants, conditions and restrictions 
binding on all of the owners of the Shopping Center parcels. With respect to drive-through 
facilities generally, the Declaration provides in relevant part that "[n]o building featuring 
drive-in, drive-up or drive-through traffic shall be located on Parcel Three, except as shown 
on the Plot Plan . . . ." [R. at 38; 377.] Thus, so long as the Plot Plan shows a "building 
featuring . . . drive-through traffic" on Parcel Three, the Declaration expressly authorizes 
such facilities. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Declaration clearly 
contemplates and expressly permits improvements such as the Drive-Through Facilities: 
No building, barricade or structure may be placed, erected or constructed 
within the Common Area on any parcel except. . . directional signs, bumper 
guards or curbs, paving, landscaping and landscape planters, lighting 
standards, driveways . . . as may be required under applicable laws, rules, 
ordinances and regulations of any governmental body having jurisdiction over 
the Shopping Center . . . . The parking and vehicular traffic patterns for the 
areas of the Shopping Center which are designated "Common Area Only" on 
the Plot Plan shall be designed, installed and maintained as shown on the Plot 
Plan. 
[R. at 33.] 
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The Plot Plan attached to the Declaration does indeed show a building featuring a 
drive-through lane on Parcel Three. [R. at 52.] Parcel Three is located in the lower right area 
of the Plot Plan. [R. at 52.] The Wendy's Property appears in the lower left area of Parcel 
Three as a rectangle. [R. at 52.] The Plot Plan shows the Drive-Through Facilities as two 
curved lines running from the northwest corner of the rectangle to the northeast onto the 
Common Area of the Shopping Center. [R. at 52.] Not surprisingly, therefore, the trial court 
expressly found that "[t]he Drive Through Facilities extend from the northwest corner of the 
restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast onto what is defined by the 
Declaration as the 'Common Area' of the Shopping Center,"1 [PL. at 377] and held that the 
Declaration expressly permits the Drive-Through Facilities [R. at 380]. 
The Declaration contains clear and explicit language by which the owners covenant 
that permitted Common Area facilities, including "drive-in, drive-up or drive-through lanes," 
[R. at 38], and related features such as "signs, bumper guards or curbs, paving, landscaping 
and landscape planters, lighting standards, driveways, sidewalks [and] walkways," [R. at 32-
33; 377-78], may be located within the Common Area. The Declaration further provides an 
express cross-easement for the use of such facilities. [R. at 34-35.] 
The existence of these express covenants and easement for the Drive-Through 
Facilities renders Nyman completely inapplicable to this case. Unlike the plaintiff in Nyman, 
Wendy's need not and does not rely on a prescriptive right to maintain the Drive-Through 
'The Court of Appeals did not disturb the trial court's factual finding on this point. 
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Facilities. Rather, much like any tenant who enjoys exclusive possession of land owned by 
another pursuant to a lease contract, Wendy's relies on the covenants and easements in the 
Declaration as the basis for its right to maintain the Drive-Through Facilities. If the plaintiff 
in Nyman had express covenant and easement rights to maintain his garage on the 
defendant's property, the plaintiffs resort to the prescriptive easement theory rejected by the 
Court would have been wholly unnecessary. Indeed, the case would likely never have arisen. 
In any event, Nyman is not implicated by this case, and the holding of Nyman is not 
controlling. The Court of Appeals correctly disregarded Appellants' Nyman argument, and 
this Court should too. 
B. The Drive-Through Facilities are Unlike the Garage at Issue in 
Nyman. 
Nyman is also inapposite because the improvements at issue in that case were 
significantly different, in both form and function, from the Drive-Through Facilities. Nyman 
involved an encroaching garage building that exclusively occupied a portion of the property 
and could be used only by the plaintiff. See Nyman, 2003 UT 27, at If  5. By contrast, the 
Drive-Through Facilities are open to all of the patrons of the Shopping Center and serve to 
separate travel and parking areas as provided by the Declaration. As reflected by the Plot 
Plan, photographs, and a survey map of the Shopping Center, the Drive-Through Facilities 
occupy "Common Area" within the Shopping Center that is adjacent to an asphalt parking 
lot. [R. at 52, 197, 209, and 248.] The Drive-Through Facilities are some distance from 
Wendy's' nearest neighbor and are low-lying and unobtrusive. Thus, while the garage at 
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issue in Nyman may have had a measurable, negative impact on the defendant's property, to 
the extent that the Drive-Through Facilities affect Appellant's property at all, they do so only 
in a positive way. 
In any event, as noted previously, the Drive-Through Facilities are expressly 
authorized and clearly provided for by the Declaration. With respect to the Drive-Through 
Facilities, the Declaration provides that: 
Common Area shall be used only for vehicular access, circulation and parking, 
pedestrian traffic and the comfort and convenience of the Owners (i.e.. the 
owners of the property to which the Declaration pertains), tenants, customers, 
invitees, licensees, agents and employees of the Owners and business 
occupants of the buildings constructed in the Shopping Center . . . . No 
building, barricade or structure may be placed, erected or constructed within 
the Common Area on any parcel except loading and delivery docks and 
covered areas attached to such docks, trash enclosures, outside storage areas 
. . . pylon (to the extent not herein prohibited) and directional signs, bumper 
guards or curbs, paving, landscaping and landscape planters, lighting 
standards, driveways, sidewalks, walkways, parking stalls, columns or pillars 
supporting roof overhangs, and any other improvements as may be required 
under applicable laws, rules, ordinances and regulations of any governmental 
body having jurisdiction over the Shopping Center . . . . The parking and 
vehicular traffic patterns for the areas of the Shopping Center which are 
designated "Common Area Only" on the Plot Plan [attached to the Declaration 
as Exhibit "A"] shall be designed, installed and maintained as shown on the 
Plot Plan. 
[R. at 32-33 (emphasis added).] Again, no agreement authorized the garage at issue in 
Nyman, much less an agreement as clearly contemplative of the Drive-Through Facilities as 
the Declaration. This fact, as well as the fact that the garage at issue in Nyman and the 
Drive-Through Facilities at issue here are materially different in form and function, 
demonstrate that the Court of Appeals' decision in this case is not in conflict with Nyman. 
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As the conflict Appellants perceive simply does not exist, Nyman provides no basis for 
reversing the Court of Appeals' decision. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL 
COURT'S GRANT OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
Appellants argue that the trial court could not enjoin Appellants' removal of the 
Drive-Through Facilities without first passing on the merits of Wendy's' claim that the 
Drive-Through Facilities are expressly authorized by the Declaration. See Brief of 
Plaintiffs/Appellants at pp. 13-15. Appellants' argument has two prongs, neither of which 
has merit. 
A. No Issue of Fact Precluded Summary Judgment. 
The first prong of Appellants' argument is that summary judgment was inappropriate 
because there is "a genuine dispute of fact as the [sic] whether or not the Drive Through 
Facilities of Wendy's are consistent with the Declaration." Brief of Plaintiffs/ Appellants at 
p. 13. Put another way, Appellants contend that whether the Drive-Through Facilities are 
located where the Declaration allows them to be located is disputed. Because there is a 
dispute, Appellants claim, it was improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment and 
enjoin the removal of the Drive-Through Facilities. In reality, there is no dispute and 
summary judgment was appropriate, as the Court of Appeals recognized.2 
2Summary judgment was appropriate without regard to the existence of a factual dispute 
about the location of the Drive-Through Facilities because such a dispute was not material to the 
trial court's determination that the statutes of limitation had run on Appellants' breach of contract 
and trespass claims. Courts recognize numerous situations in which the passage of time results in 
a non-owner's exclusive right to use another party's property. See, e.g., Hirshfield v. Schwartz, 110 
Cal. Rptr.2d 861, 871-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming trial court's creation of an equitable right 
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While the Court of Appeals declined to address the issue, the trial court correctly 
determined that the Drive-Through Facilities are indeed located in accordance with the 
Declaration. The Declaration is a contract like any other. As such, so long as the 
Declaration is unambiguous, the interpretation of the Declaration is a matter of law. See 
Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, ^ 36, 70 P.3d 1. A contract is ambiguous "if 
it is 'unclear, it omits terms, or the terms used to express the intentions of the parties may be 
understood to have two or more plausible meanings.'" Quaid v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 
2007 UT 27,110, 158 P.3d 525 (quoting Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, f 15, 133 P.3d 
428). 
The Declaration is unambiguous with respect to the location of the Drive-Through Facilities 
because the Plot Plan clearly shows their position. Indeed, Wendy's and Appellants agreed that the 
Plot Plan represents the Drive-Through Facilities with two curved lines extending from the 
northwest corner of the rectangle representing the Wendy's restaurant. [R. at 120,279.] Inasmuch 
as the Plot Plan includes only one pair of curved lines to represent the Drive-Through Facilities, the 
Plot Plan is not susceptible to more than one meaning. Further, because the Plot Plan is clearly not 
drawn to scale, includes no dimensions, and purports to be nothing more than a sketch of the 
Shopping Center, the parties to the Declaration must have intended to permit construction of the 
Drive-Through Facilities where they in fact constructed them. Had the parties to the Declaration 
wanted to specify the location of the Drive-Through Facilities with greater precision than they chose 
to occupy property owned by others); Noronha v. Stewart, 245 Cal. Rptr. 94, 96-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1988) (reversing trial court's determination that defendants did not have an irrevocable license to 
maintain a wall on plaintiffs' property). 
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to, they could have done so. That they did not demonstrates their intent to provide for construction 
of the Drive-Through Facilities where the Plot Plan generally shows them to be. Any purported 
ambiguity regarding the intended location of the Drive-Through Facilities was completely removed 
when the Drive-Through Facilities were constructed in 1982. 
Appellants attempted to create a factual dispute with the expert testimony of Mark Babbitt. 
Mr. Babbitt purported to approximate a scale for the Plot Plan of one inch being equal to 125 feet. 
[R. at 279.] Using his estimate, Mr. Babbitt compared the Plot Plan with a recent, to-scale survey 
map of the Shopping Center. Mr. Babbitt contended that his methodology shows that the Drive-
Through Facilities are between two and approximately ten feet from the locations specified by the 
Plot Plan. [R. at 280-81 ("The North edge of the access for the drive thru window in [the Plot Plan] 
angles to the Southwest and is from 2 feet to over 10 feet closer to Wendy's north property line than 
the access shown on Wendy's survey.").] A litigant cannot, however, prevent the entry of 
summary judgment merely by asserting that an issue of material fact exists. Rather, there 
must be a genuine dispute. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In this case there was not. Since the 
Plot Plan is not a to-scale survey, all Mr. Babbitt demonstrated is that the Drive-Through 
Facilities are, where the parties to the Declaration constructed them, as depicted on the Plot 
Plan. 
The parties to the Declaration obviously eschewed precision when it came to depicting 
the location where they constructed the Drive-Through Facilities. The parties were content 
to simply sketch two curved lines extending from the rectangle representing the Wendy's 
restaurant. In consequence, the trial court correctly determined that there was no genuine 
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dispute that the Drive-Through Facilities are located consistent with the Plot Plan. Summary 
judgment in Wendy's' favor was thus appropriate and the Court should affirm the Court of 
Appeals. 
B. The Court of Appeals Properly Affirmed the Trial Court's Denial 
of Appellants' Demand for Injunctive Relief. 
Appellants' also assail the Court of Appeals' affirmation of the trial court's issuance 
of an injunction by arguing that it was improper to enjoin removal of the Drive-Through 
Facilities before "any judgment on the merits of [Wendy's'] breach of contract claim." Brief 
of Plaintiffs/Appellants at p. 14. Appellants are mistaken about the nature of the trial court's 
disposition of this case in two respects. 
Appellants' first mistake is in believing that the trial court failed to pass on the merits 
of Wendy's' claims before enjoining interference with the Drive-Through Facilities. Id. In 
fact, the trial court fully considered the location of the Drive-Through Facilities and entered 
appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The trial court concluded in relevant 
part as follows: 
9. Although the Declaration generally forbids the construction of 
improvements on common areas, it expressly authorizes Drive Through 
Facilities located on Parcel three as shown on the Plot Plan. 
10. The Drive Through Facilities are consequently excepted from the 
Declaration's general prohibition of improvements on the Common Area and 
are, in fact, expressly permitted. 
11. Because the Drive Through Facilities are expressly permitted by 
the Declaration, Wendy's' is entitled to a declaratory judgment decreeing that 
the Drive Through Facilities may remain in use in their present location and 
configuration. 
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[R. at 380.] Clearly, the trial court interpreted the Declaration and, based on the undisputed 
fact that the Drive-Through Facilities are located consistent with the Plot Plan, properly 
issued an injunction. 
Appellants' second mistake is their assertion that "the only injunction at issue before 
the trial court or the Court of Appeals was the injunction issued by the trial court on Wendy's 
request." BriefofPlaintiffs/Appellantsatp. 14. This was not the case. Wendy's moved for 
summary judgment "on all causes of action asserted in [Appellants'] Amended Complaint, 
and all causes of action asserted in Wendy's Counterclaim." [R. at 114-15.] While Wendy's 
Counterclaim certainly included a request for injunctive relief, Appellants' Amended 
Complaint did too. Indeed, the First Cause of Action set forth in Appellants' Amended 
Complaint demanded "an order . . . requiring Wendy's to vacate the property and to restore 
the property to its condition prior to the construction of the drive-through facilities." [R. at 
81.] Thus, Appellants' request for an injunction requiring removal of the Drive-Through 
Facilities was squarely before the trial court on Wendy's' motion for summary judgment. 
The Court of Appeals did not, as Appellants suggest, improperly allow Wendy's to 
use the statutes of limitation applicable to Appellants' breach of contract and trespass claims 
as a sword, rather than as a shield. See Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellants at pp. 14-15. Rather, 
the trial court and Court of Appeals both correctly ruled that Appellants' contract and 
trespass claims are time-barred. In consequence, the Court of Appeals explained, Appellants' 
request for injunctive relief is also untimely. See 2007 UT App 211, f^ J 27-30 (citing Field-
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Escandon v. DeMann, 251 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52-53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) and Troeger v. Fink, 
332 P.2d 779, 782-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) for the proposition that requests for injunctive 
relief for the removal of permanent trespasses are barred by the statute of limitation 
applicable to trespass claims). Significantly, Appellants do not contest the Court of Appeals' 
determination that their request for injunctive relief is time-barred. 
This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals' decision without regard to the precise 
basis for the injunctive relief granted below. SeeAfridi v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2005 
UT 53, f 5, 122 P.3d 596 (quoting Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) 
('"We may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the [district] court, even 
if it is one not relied on below.'")) This is so because it makes no practical difference whether 
the lower courts ruled that Wendy's is entitled to an injunction or that Appellants are not 
entitled to an injunction. Wendy' s sought an injunction "restraining [Appellants] from taking 
any action to inhibit or preclude Wendy's from using and maintaining [the Drive-Through 
Facilities]." [R. at 23.] Appellants demanded an order requiring the elimination of the 
Drive-Through Facilities. [R. at 81.] Given that these requests are obviously diametrical 
opposites, granting Wendy's' request and denying Appellants' demand produce precisely the 
same result: the Drive-Through Facilities remain in their present location. As the Court of 
Appeals correctly concluded that Appellants' right to challenge the location of the Drive-
Through Facilities expired many years ago, Appellants are altogether without a legal right 
to remove the Drive-Through Facilities. The lower courts correctly enjoined them from 
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doing so without regard to whose claim for injunctive relief was granted and whose was 
denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the Court of Appeals' decision with respect to injunctive 
relief for all of the foregoing reasons. 
DATED this / day of January, 2008. 
PARRWADDOUPSBROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
By: 
Ronald G. Fussell 
Matthew J. iall 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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